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INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act (HSR Act) in 1976,1 firms planning mergers of a
certain value are required to notify the antitrust agencies in order
to make the agencies aware of combinations that may cause com-
petitive issues. Either the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or
Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ) (collectively, “the
agencies”) will analyze the proposed merger, and if the agency has
reason to believe the merger will be anticompetitive,2 it may con-
sider modifications to the deal that would eliminate competitive
concerns or seek an injunction to keep the parties from consummat-
ing their merger.3 The agencies and parties typically seek to modify
the deal to preserve or restore the competitive landscape that
1. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90
Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006)); see also Hart-Scott-Rodino,
Premerger Notification Program, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/index.shtm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)
3. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
§ 1 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html (“The
Agencies seek to identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding
unnecessary interference with mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral.
Most merger analysis is necessarily predictive, requiring an assessment of what will likely
happen if a merger proceeds as compared to what will likely happen if it does not. Given this
inherent need for prediction, these Guidelines reflect the congressional intent that merger
enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their incipiency and that certainty
about anticompetitive effect is seldom possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”).
Procedurally, parties typically offer a modification or settlement to the agency, and the agency
considers that proposal based on agency policy and the particular facts of the merger. See
infra text accompanying note 18.
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existed before the merger4 by creating a viable competitor to replace
the acquired or merged firm.5
If the agencies and parties agree on an acceptable modification,
they may enter into a binding final judgment, or consent decree,
that memorializes their agreement.6 Courts have the power under
the Tunney Act to determine whether a final judgment that the DOJ
proposes is “in the public interest.”7 Because courts do not have the
power to conduct their own analyses beyond whether a proposed
divestiture will be in the public interest, it is the realm of the anti-
trust agencies to build divestiture packages that will not only be in
the public interest, but that will also adequately remedy competitive
4. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 7
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/272350.pdf (“The goal of a divestiture is to ensure that the purchaser
possesses both the means and the incentive to preserve competition.”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 DOJ
POLICY GUIDE], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf
(“Although the remedy should always be sufficient to redress the antitrust violation, the
purpose of a remedy is not to enhance premerger competition but to restore it.”); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S BUREAU
OF COMPETITION ON NEGOTIATING MERGER REMEDIES (2003) [hereinafter FTC STATEMENT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices.shtm (describing the FTC’s
“remedial objective” as “to prevent the anticompetitive effects likely to result from a merger
that the Commission has determined is unlawful”). The Supreme Court has agreed that
restoring competition is the “key to the whole question of an antitrust remedy.” United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961).
5. As former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris noted, the new competitor must be a viable
business entity in practice, not just a creation of lawyers. Timothy Muris, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission: In a Word—
Continuity (Aug. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murisaba. shtm. 
6. See FTC Guide to the Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (“If the [agency]
believes that a person or company has violated the law or that a proposed merger may violate
the law, the agency may attempt to obtain voluntary compliance by entering into a consent
order with the company.”).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (requiring the DOJ to file with the court a proposed consent
decree and a competitive impact statement that describes the relief sought); see also United
States v. W. Elec. Co., 993 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the “court’s function
is not to determine whether the resulting array of rights and liabilities ‘is one that will best
serve society,’ but only to confirm that the resulting settlement is within the reaches of the
public interest”). The Tunney Act does not apply to the FTC; there is no review of the FTC
consents by a district court because the Commission acts as the trial court. Farrell Malone
& J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?, J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471, 476 (2007).
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problems caused by a merger.8 When the FTC and DOJ allow a
merger to go through with a divestiture, they aim to use the di-
vestiture to recreate the pre-merger competitive landscape.9 In
creating a divestiture package, the policy of both agencies has been
to find an acceptable buyer who is financially viable and can use the
divested assets to replace the amount of competition lost in the
merger.10 However, “[t]he view persists that the two antitrust
agencies approach the issue of merger remedies differently.”11
Although the agencies tend to downplay the differences in their
policies and preferences regarding the level of agency involvement
in building a divestiture package, they behave differently in several
notable respects. The agencies have different policies on: imple-
menting “fix-it-first” remedies, which allow the parties to restruc-
ture their deal before consummating the merger without entering
into a consent order;12 requiring the divesting party to find an “up-
front” buyer before agreeing to a consent order;13 and using “crown
jewel provisions,” by which the agency requires the merging firms
to agree to divest a particular high value asset that in and of itself
may not be necessary to restore competition but is more likely to
attract desirable buyers.14 The DOJ’s recently published 2011 Policy
Guide to Merger Remedies seems to have closed some of the gaps
between the agencies’ policies, indicating convergence of FTC and
DOJ practices, but differences remain.15
8. See Plaintiff’s Response to Public Comments at 4, United States v. 3D Sys. Corp., No.
CIV 1:01cv01237(GK) (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f10100/10102.pdf (“The Tunney Act does not empower the Court to reject the remedies in the
proposed Final Judgment based on the belief that ‘other remedies were preferable.’” (citing
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995))).
9. See FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4.
10. As noted in both the 2004 and 2011 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger
Remedies, merging firms have an “incentive to divest fewer assets than are required for the
purchaser to compete effectively going forward.” 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 9;
see also 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 13. This highlights the necessity of carefully
analyzing proposed divestitures in order to achieve the goal of restoring post-merger
competition to its pre-merger level. See id.
11. Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Looking Forward: Merger and
Other Policy Initiatives at the FTC (Nov. 18, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
majoras/041118abafallforum.pdf.
12. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
13. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
14. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.
15. See 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4.
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This Note argues that the agencies should adopt the same
approach to divestitures. Consistency between the agencies would
allow merging firms more certainty during a process that can be
risky and expensive. Federal antitrust enforcement has a major
impact on the economy because businesses have a significant fi-
nancial stake in how their mergers are analyzed. Given the
amount of time the agencies spend immersed in a particular product
market learning about the adequacy of different firms as competi-
tive forces, the FTC’s hands-on approach to divestiture remedies16
is more effective than that of the DOJ.17 The agencies should be
active and involved when creating a divestiture package that will
adequately replace lost competition to ensure that any proposed
remedy will be effective. To this end, the agencies should focus their
divestiture policies on reducing the risk that a divestiture will be
unsuccessful and on trying to eliminate the possibility that consum-
ers will suffer higher prices or lower quality products as a result.
Part I discusses why the agencies view divestitures as the optimal
remedy to a potentially anticompetitive merger and examines the
background of divestiture remedies. Part II addresses the FTC’s
success in pursuing a more involved divestiture policy. Part III ana-
lyzes the basic similarities and differences between the antitrust
policies of the FTC and the DOJ and discusses concerns the anti-
trust community has raised regarding those differences. Finally,
this Note concludes that consistency between the agencies is essen-
tial and argues that because the FTC’s policy is the stronger of the
two, the DOJ should espouse the FTC’s more aggressive policy.
16. See discussion infra Part III.C.
17. Because actual merger investigations are confidential within the investigating agency
and most nonbasic information becomes publicly available only when a matter is taken to
court, the research in this Note is necessarily based on limited information. The FTC’s 1999
Divestiture Study, discussed in Part II.A, is the only large-scale compilation of data
attempting to analyze the success of divestitures; the DOJ has not conducted a similar study.
A large-scale study of divestiture success would be beneficial in evaluating which policies are
most effective in limiting the anticompetitive effects of mergers.
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I. DIVESTITURE AS A PREFERABLE ANTITRUST REMEDY
A. Background
When competing firms plan to merge, an antitrust investigation
may reveal competitive concerns. When an antitrust agency ex-
presses such concerns about a proposed merger, the agency and
merging firms typically engage in negotiations in an attempt to
modify the deal to reduce the risk that the merger will harm com-
petition.18 The typical modification to a potentially anticompetitive
merger is the divestiture, or sale, of overlapping products or
assets.19 Structural remedies, especially divestitures, are usually
favored over conduct-based remedies,20 especially with mergers and
acquisitions between large companies, because the competitively
overlapping products often represent only a small part of the over-
all deal.21 Conduct-based remedies, by contrast, are generally dis-
favored because they are more regulatory in nature, requiring
greater scrutiny and monitoring.22 In looking for a buyer for the
assets to be divested, the agencies do not necessarily favor a certain
type of buyer but simply accept a buyer who is ready, willing, and
18. See Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerfaq.shtm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
19. See FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4.
20. See, e.g., 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 7-8 (stating that structural
remedies are preferred over conduct remedies because they provide more certainty and
require less government involvement and post-merger monitoring); Proposed Final Judgment
at 8, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm’t Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00139 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010),
2010 WL 5699134 (noting that FTC sought to require one of the merging firms to license key
software to a competitor); see also 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 6.
21. Steven Tenn & John M. Yun, The Success of Divestitures in Merger Enforcement:
Evidence from the J&J-Pfizer Transaction 2 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ., Working
Paper No. 296, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp296.pdf (studying the
FTC’s investigation of Johnson & Johnson’s 2006 acquisition of Pfizer’s consumer health
division).
22. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE
TO MERGER REMEDIES 7 (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
205108.htm (“Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases because
they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement
in the market.”).
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able to compete in the relevant market.23 A “successful” divestiture
may be defined as one that modifies the transaction to maintain the
pre-merger level of competition.24
Certain factors, like expediency, may sometimes outweigh the
agencies’ wish to create a divestiture package and find a buyer that
will leave the competitive landscape exactly the same as it was
before a proposed merger. For example, in the recent acquisition of
the bankrupt Penn Traffic company by Tops Markets LLC, inflexi-
bility by the FTC could have led to liquidation of Penn Traffic’s
assets by a bankruptcy court.25 In this case, the FTC agreed to allow
the deal to close on time, and Tops Markets agreed to keep open all
Penn Traffic locations until the FTC completed a full investigation
and at that point sell off any stores the FTC found necessary to
solve competitive issues.26
The agencies craft appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis.
In some markets, especially in declining markets, a buyer that can
adequately compete in the post-merger market either does not exist
or does not step up.27 The FTC generally disfavors advance settle-
ment agreements because of the amount of uncertainty and inflex-
ibility that remains once the deal has gone through. However, there
23. The FTC, for example, has found acceptable buyers in 
parties who do not operate in the market, but who have a track record of
operating similar assets successfully[,] … parties who have operated other
businesses successfully and have brought together a management team
experienced in the relevant market[,] … [f]irms operating in different geographic
markets but within the same product market[,] … [f]irms who operate in related
product markets, either in the relevant geographic market or outside the
relevant geographic market[,] ... [and] smaller firms ... operating within the
same geographic and product markets.
Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, supra note 18.
24. Like most scholarship in the field, this Note evaluates the “success” of merger policy
based on the effectiveness of that policy in replacing or restoring competition. Evaluation of
success in merger enforcement can also include whether the agencies are investigating and
blocking the right mergers, but such considerations are beyond the scope of this Note. See,
e.g., Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 1.
25. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks Public Comments on Trustee’s
Proposal to Divest Two Stores Under Whole Foods Market Inc. Divestiture Order (Mar. 2,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/03/wholefoods.shtm.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Cecile Kohrs Lindell, Hit the Books, DEAL MAG., Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.
thedeal.com/magazine/ID/030979/insights/hit-the-books.php.
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are situations in which a full investigation that might find a more
appropriate remedy may be more cumbersome than helpful.
An analysis of divestiture policy is important because the
agencies favor divestitures over other types of merger remedies.28
Without the divestiture option, the decision to approve a merger
would essentially be binary—either permit the merger or block it.29
Putting together an acceptable divestiture package is far easier,
more certain, and less costly for merging firms than fighting the
antitrust agencies in court; often the problematic asset is only a
small part of the overall deal.30 
As shown by statistics assembled annually for Congress by the
FTC and DOJ pursuant to the HSR Act, the majority of filed
mergers with which the agencies take issue are resolved with some
type of divestiture, whether by consent order or by the parties re-
structuring their deal to alleviate the agency’s antitrust concerns.31
Over the period of 2003-2007, of 144 reported mergers, 51 percent
were settled with consent orders, with an additional 13 percent
restructured after the DOJ informed the parties of its concerns.32
Only 9 percent of challenged mergers were litigated, with the
remaining 28 percent abandoned by the parties.33 The agencies also
take into consideration the litigation risks that deeming a proposed
28. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-31 (1961)
(“Divestiture has been called the most important of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively
easy to administer, and sure. It should be in the forefront of a court’s mind when a violation
of § 7 has been found.”); FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4; see also 2004 DOJ Policy Guide, supra
note 4, at 7 (“Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases because
they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement
in the market.”); Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Evolving Approach to Merger
Remedies, ANTITRUST REP., May 2000, at 2, 5.
29. Penelope Papandropoulos & Alessandro Tejana, The Merger Remedies Study: In
Divestiture We Trust?, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 443 (2006) (analyzing a 2005 study
published by DG Competition that considered forty recent merger decisions in the European
Union).
30. See 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4; FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4.
31. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANN. REP.,
FISCAL YEAR 2009 at 7, 11 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/10/101001
hsrreport.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANN. REP.
FISCAL YEAR 2008 at 7, 14 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/07/hsrreport.pdf;
FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTT-RODINO ANN. REP., FISCAL YEAR 2007
at 3 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/11/hsrreportfy 2007.pdf.
32. See sources cited supra note 31.
33. See sources cited supra note 31.
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buyer unacceptable would create; as noted in the FTC’s Divestiture
Study,34 sometimes the risks of litigation are high enough that the
Agency may accept a proposal that is viable but not optimal.35
Because divestitures are the most common remedy and because it
is often unclear which agency will investigate a particular proposed
merger, it is important to look at the notable differences in the
agencies’ divestiture policies.
B. Allocation of Investigations Between the FTC and DOJ
1. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
The antitrust agencies have undergone several recent changes in
an attempt to make the process of filing a merger more transparent
and less risky, beginning after Congress passed the HSR Act in
1976. The objectives of the HSR Act were twofold: first, to limit
harm to competition between the time when an anticompetitive
merger occurs and the time when the antitrust agencies are able to
solve the competitive problem and, second, to enable the agencies to
effectively restore competition to its premerger level.36 Professor
Kenneth Elzinga famously pointed out that prior to the passage of
the HSR Act, divestitures were often slow and ineffective, leaving
the agencies with only “Pyrrhic” victories.37 Another study by Robert
Rogowsky evaluated 104 divestiture orders between 1969 and 1980
and concluded that 80 percent were unsuccessful, mostly due to the
amount of elapsed time before the divestiture was put into place.38
Because of the premerger requirements set forth in the HSR Act,
the agencies are now in a better position to evaluate divestitures
that will lead to a successful replacement of competition.
34. See discussion infra Part II.A.
35. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 6 (1999)
[hereinafter DIVESTITURE STUDY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf.
36. Id. at 1 (detailing the FTC’s Bureau of Competition’s ongoing study of divestiture
orders the Commission issued between 1990 and 1994).
37. Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 44,
50-51 (1969).
38. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 1 n.3 (citing R. Rogowsky, An Economic
Study of Antimerger Remedies (May 1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Virginia)) (analyzing mergers in which a divestiture order had successfully been obtained).
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The HSR Act prohibits the acquisition of voting securities and
assets of a certain value without filing notice to, and gaining
approval from, the antitrust agencies.39 The HSR Act aimed to
strengthen the agencies’ ability to enforce antitrust laws by creating
notification and waiting period requirements for firms planning
mergers and acquisitions.40 Without these premerger requirements,
the remedial measures merging firms took were often inadequate to
solve anticompetitive problems, leaving the agencies to “unscram-
bl[e] the eggs” after an anticompetitive merger had already been
consummated.41 Under the HSR Act, after the parties file, they must
wait thirty days before consummating their merger;42 this require-
ment gives the agencies a chance to evaluate the potential risks to
consumers of a proposed merger and, if necessary, to negotiate with
the parties to modify the deal and mitigate likely anticompetitive
effects. If necessary, the HSR Act allows the agencies time to gather
adequate information to meet the burden of proof required to pre-
liminarily enjoin a potentially anticompetitive merger.43 
2. Attempted Reforms to the Clearance Process
Firms planning a merger or acquisition that meets the HSR Act’s
value threshold must file with both the FTC and the DOJ.44
Significantly, under the Clayton Act, only one of the antitrust agen-
cies can investigate any specific proposed merger.45 The agencies
decide which will investigate the proposed merger according to
formally allocated areas of responsibility, mostly based on expertise
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1) (2006) (requiring firms planning mergers—other than those
exempt under subsection C—that would result in the acquiring firm holding in excess of $200
million, adjusted at the beginning of each fiscal year for inflation, to give notice).
40. The Clayton Act and the FTC Act: A Response to Dissatisfaction with a Broad Antitrust
Statute, Antitrust Laws & Trade Reg. (MB) § 9.03[4][f][I] (1997).
41. S. REP. NO. 94-803, pt. 1, at 61 (1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1).
43. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, at 8 (1976) (“[W]ithout advance notice of an impending merger,
data relevant to its legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a case, the government
often has no meaningful chance to carry its burden of proof, and win a preliminary injunction
against a merger that appears to violate section 7.”).
44. Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d)(1).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(f); Media Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and DOJ Announce
New Clearance Procedures for Antitrust Matters (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.ftc
.gov/opa/2002/03/clearance.shtm. 
2012] SETTING THE TERMS OF A BREAK-UP 2157
and experience in a given industry.46 The agencies occasionally
disagree as to which will analyze a given merger, especially in high-
profile mergers and mergers in “gray area” industries that may fall
into the expertise area of both agencies.47
Since 1948, the agencies have had a policy not to proceed with an
investigation until one had “cleared” it with the other.48 The clear-
ance process is generally seen as creating contention between the
agencies, often causing significant delay in investigations.49 Leading
up to 2002, the clearance process was especially “non-transparent,”
making it very difficult for merging firms to determine which agency
would review their merger.50 Following a period of “deteriorat[ion]”
in the clearance process, from about 1999 until 2002, officials from
the agencies collaborated to negotiate and issue a more transparent
policy.51 These negotiations led to the 2002 Clearance Agreement.52 
The 2002 Clearance Agreement, which allocated product markets
and related products to one agency or the other based on clear
expertise, was the subject of much criticism from consumer groups
that felt the FTC should enjoy a wider subject matter allocation.53
For example, when the agreement allocated media and entertain-
ment mergers to the DOJ, some commentators, like Timothy Muris,
argued that the FTC’s investigation of the AOL/Time Warner
merger gave it a “superior claim to expertise” in media and commu-
46. See Number of Enforcement Actions and Substantial Investigations by DOJ and FTC,
by Industry, FY 1997 – Present, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/02/
clearance/clearchart.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (detailing, by industry, the number of
enforcement actions and substantial investigations by each agency and to which agency the
2002 Clearance Agreement allocated the product market); Overview of the FTC/DOJ
Clearance Agreement, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/04/clearanceoverview.
shtm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012) (“The allocations in the draft clearance agreement were
developed based on three criteria: prior expertise; the benefit of one agency evaluating all
segments within a specific industry; and an effort to divide matters between the agencies
evenly.”).
47. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Comments on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process Before the
Antitrust Modernization Commission 2-5 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/Muris_Statement.pdf.
48. See Overview of the FTC/DOJ Clearance Agreement, supra note 46. 




53. See id. 
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nications.54 In the end, uncertainties created by the 2002 Clearance
Agreement did not matter because the agreement was abandoned
shortly after it was publicized.55 The agreement’s failure returned
federal antitrust enforcement to the status quo and the contentious-
ness that naturally arises out of the dual jurisdiction shared by the
FTC and DOJ.56
Despite the agencies’ efforts to create bright-line allocation rules,
boundaries between industries often remain unclear.57 Although the
agencies have agreed on which will handle some cases, such as in
situations in which one agency has clear expertise over the other,58
many merging firms are left guessing as to whether their merger
will be investigated by the FTC or the DOJ. Ideally, firms planning
mergers within certain industries would have a clear idea of which
agency would evaluate their merger, for planning purposes. The
continuing opacity of the clearance process, especially in industries
like energy and media in which there is considerable disagreement
over which agency should prevail, presents extra hurdles by “pre-
clud[ing] the parties from approaching an agency before filing a
premerger notice to begin identifying and addressing competitive
concerns.”59
54. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 47, at 14.
55. See Lauren Kearney Peay, Note, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ
Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1334-35 (2007) (discussing the downfall of
the 2002 Clearance Agreement and the lack of clarity created by the overlapping jurisdictions
of the two agencies).
56. As Former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris suggested after the Clearance Agreement
was abandoned, the lack of agreement between the agencies may even lead to skewed
incentives. When the agency decides whether to investigate a merger, it may issue a second
request to strategically stake a claim to similar mergers in the future. Muris, supra note 47,
at 2.
57. See Overview of the FTC/DOJ Clearance Agreement, supra note 46 (“For example,
because the DOJ historically has investigated electricity, while the FTC has investigated all
other energy matters, convergence mergers between electricity and natural gas companies
have led to contentious disputes regarding which agency should investigate. Moreover,
although the FTC predominantly has investigated computer hardware and the DOJ has
investigated computer software, matters involving both have become increasingly common,
resulting in clearance disputes.”).
58. Id.
59. See Muris, supra note 47, at 7.
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II. THE SUCCESS OF THE FTC’S DIVESTITURE POLICY
A. The 1999 FTC Divestiture Study
The most recent comprehensive internal study of divestiture
“success” is the FTC Bureau of Competition’s 1999 Study of thirty-
seven divestitures that occurred from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year
1994.60 In the Study, the FTC analyzed case studies and interviewed
divestiture buyers to determine whether the buyer had been able to
quickly become a viable competitor in the relevant market.61 Based
on these criteria, the FTC Study found that twenty-eight of the
thirty-seven divestitures had successfully met the divestiture
objectives.62 
The FTC studied a number of factors that led to the success or
failure of a divestiture, including firm size and relationship with the
divesting firm, the “respondent.”63 The FTC identified three factors
that impeded a successful divestiture. First, respondents wanted
the smallest possible divestiture package.64 The Study found that
because of this, in hindsight, some packages were not adequate to
serve the remedial purposes of the divestiture.65 Second, respon-
dents wanted to divest to weak buyers.66 Respondent firms are re-
quired to propose “acceptable” buyers and typically do not make a
point of choosing those who would be competitive forces in the post-
merger market.67 In fact, the Study found that many buyers believed
they had specifically been chosen because they would not pose a
60. A number of smaller studies and surveys have been conducted after specific mergers
or regarding particular product markets. For a list and brief descriptions of these studies, see
Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 4-5 & n.4.
61. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 8. 
62. Id. at 9-10.
63. Id. at 10-15.
64. Id. at 16.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17.
67. Id.
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viable competitive threat.68 Third, respondents acted in ways to
limit the success of the buyer in the relevant market.69
These reactions seem to be logical, given that the respondent firm
is essentially helping to create a new competitor for itself. The FTC
identified several additional problems on the buyer side: (1) buyers
lack information and expertise in the relevant market, (2) some
buyers felt they lacked bargaining power against respondent firms,
(3) buyers often do not communicate with the FTC about issues they
face in negotiation, and (4) the buyers’ incentives differ from those
of the FTC.70
The FTC Divestiture Study proposed a number of solutions to the
identified problems, including a more active role in ensuring the
success of the buyer of the divested portion.71 The FTC Study
recommended changing the incentives of the respondent firm by
appointing divestiture trustees or monitor trustees, authorizing
crown jewel provisions in the case of an uncooperative respondent,
and requiring consequential damages.72 Additionally, it suggested
facilitating the success of the buyer by giving the buyer easier access
to important and accurate information before asking the buyer to
compete in a complex market and giving the buyer certain require-
ments beyond basic due diligence.73
Ultimately the Study recommended choosing a knowledgeable,
experienced, and committed buyer.74 It reiterated the well-estab-
lished need for an “appropriate buyer” in a way that underlined a
key difference between the FTC’s and DOJ’s policies.75 The Study’s
key findings point to the necessity of a more active role of the
68. Id. (“They are not required to choose the person likely to be the strongest buyer, and
many buyers reported they had the impression they were chosen because respondent did not
expect them to be a strong competitor.”).
69. See id. at 18. For example, in one case, the buyer acquired the rights to manufacture
a product and contracted with the seller so that the seller would continue to supply the buyer
with that product until the buyer could manufacture the product on its own. However, after
the acquisition, the seller was unable to deliver the product for a significant period of time,
which the buyer suggested may have been an intentional impediment to the buyer’s ability
to compete. Id.
70. Id. at 20-27.
71. Id. at 29-37.
72. Id. at 29-31.
73. Id. at 32.
74. Id. at 32-34.
75. Id. at 33.
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agency in finding a buyer who will adequately replace competition
after the merger.76 
The Divestiture Study provided the background for the FTC’s
policy and goals for maintaining competitive levels through a
successful divestiture package. Its conclusions also justify the FTC’s
frequent requirement of up-front buyers as a means of facilitating
a quick divestiture.77 The Study further maintains that buyers are
more likely to be successful when an entire line of business is
divested—rather than just selected assets—a conclusion that has
been incorporated into many FTC divestiture orders.78 The DOJ has
not, to date, conducted a similar study of its own ordered divesti-
tures. 
The 1999 FTC Divestiture Study was the last broad retrospective
examination of the success of divestiture approaches.79 As such,
considering a select number of cases in which divestitures were
considered successful or unsuccessful is helpful in analyzing which
methods are actually most useful. 
B. Agency Involvement Has Led to Divestiture Success
A number of recent FTC cases emphasize the agency’s deter-
mination to stick to its more involved practices. In several recent
instances, the FTC rejected as inadequate a fix-it-first approach
that the merging parties had proposed.80 The FTC’s stance in
General Mills’ acquisition of Pillsbury, the proposed acquisition of
Seagram Spirits by Diageo and Pernod Ricard, Libbey’s proposed
acquisition of Anchor Hocking, Arch Coal’s proposed acquisition of
Triton, and the proposed merger of CCC Holdings and Mitchell
76. Id. (“The Commission generally allows the respondent the first opportunity to market
the assets (although it must do so within a specified period of time). This, however, gives the
respondent an opportunity to seek weak buyers. As a consequence, the Commission needs to
be able to identify which buyers are likely to succeed and which are not. The decision is
always fact specific, but the case studies offer some helpful rules of thumb.”).
77. See infra Part III.C.2.
78. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 42; see also Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at
5 (describing the impact of the FTC Study on divestiture orders).
79. See Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 4-5 & n.4.
80. See Casey R. Triggs, Shielding Consumers from Risk: FTC Divestiture Policy, 17
ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 75 (discussing several examples of matters in which the FTC
adhered to an involved remedy policy in order to reduce consumer risk).
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International are several such examples.81 The FTC commissioners
expressed concerns about a number of aspects of the parties’
proposed fix in General Mills’ acquisition of Pillsbury, including the
mix-and-match nature of the asset package, the up-front buyer’s
ability to replace competition, and continued entanglements be-
tween remaining competitors over the ability to market the
Doughboy brand.82 Although the Commissioners ultimately dead-
locked over whether to bring an enforcement action—hence the
nickname “Doughboy Deadlock”—the Commissioners’ concerns
highlighted the FTC’s resolve in maintaining its policy of demand-
ing adequate settlements to minimize risk to consumers.83
In Diageo PLC and Pernod Ricard S.A.’s, proposed joint acquisi-
tion of Seagram Spirits and Wine the FTC authorized its staff to
seek a preliminary injunction to block the acquisition after the
parties were unwilling to divest a sufficient asset package.84 A
crown jewel provision was included in the asset package that the
FTC ultimately accepted, and a divestiture trustee was appointed
to make sure that the competitive value of the assets was main-
tained.85
In Libbey’s proposed acquisition of its primary competitor—
Anchor Hocking—from Newell Rubbermaid, the merging parties
attempted to circumvent the FTC by amending their agreement and
taking the fix directly to the district court.86 The court found that
the amended merger agreement would “potentially have the same
anti-competitive effect that the initial merger agreement would
have had on the market” and granted a preliminary injunction.87
This result shows that not only are merging parties unlikely to try
to evade the FTC by taking an inadequate fix to court but also that
the FTC will likely maintain its position.88
81. Id. at 77.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Authorizes Suit to Block Joint
Acquisition of Seagram Spirits and Wine by Diageo PLC and Pernod Ricard S.A. (Oct. 23,
2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/10/diageo.shtm. 
85. See Triggs, supra note 80, at 77.
86. FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 38 (D.D.C. 2002).
87. Id. at 55.
88. See Triggs, supra note 80, at 77.
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In the case of Arch Coal’s proposed acquisition of Triton Coal, the
parties attempted a pre-merger fix by showing their intention to
divest a coal mine.89 The FTC rejected this proposed fix and sought
a preliminary injunction in district court.90 Although the court
ultimately accepted a fix that the FTC had rejected, the case showed
the FTC’s willingness to litigate fixes that it deemed inadequate.91
In FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., the merging firms—CCC Holdings
and Mitchell International, both competitors in the market for
automobile estimatics software—offered a fix to remedy the
anticompetitive concerns posed by a three-to-two merger in the
market.92 The parties amended their deal to rework a restrictive
license of Mitchell’s web-based estimatics system to a much smaller
competitor, Web-Est, which Mitchell owned in part.93 The FTC
rejected the fix and took the case to court, pointing out that the
proposed fix was inadequate due to the huge difference between the
sizes and the revenues of the merging firms and Web-Est.94 The
court noted that Web-Est would not truly be an independent com-
petitor because of its continued relationship with Mitchell and
because Web-Est would continue to license Mitchell’s database for
up to five years.95 The FTC won a preliminary injunction, after
which the parties abandoned the merger.96
C. Past “Unsuccessful” FTC Divestitures
The FTC has not always been aggressive in its divestiture policy;
its 1999 Divestiture Study notes several past “failed” divestitures
that may have led the FTC to become more involved in its divesti-
89. Katherine A. Ambrogi, Note, The Elephant in the Courtroom: Litigating the Pre-Merger
Fix in Arch Coal and Beyond, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2006).
90. Id. at 1784.
91. Id. at 1793 (arguing that courts should give deference to the FTC’s expertise in the
case of proposed fixes).
92. FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 56 (D.D.C. 2009). 
93. Id. at 56-57.
94. Id. at 58 (suggesting that comparing Web-Est to the merged CCC-Mitchell would be
comparing “an ant to an elephant”).
95. Id. at 59.
96. Id. at 77; see also Jay S. Brown, Federal Trade Commission v. CCC Holdings – The
Beginning of a New Era for the FTC?, MAYER BROWN (June 25, 2009), http://www.
mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=6884&nid=6.
2164 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:2147
tures.97 For example, in Flowers, the chosen buyer “scrapped the
divested assets and resold them for a profit rather than go into
business.”98 In another case, the Institut Merieux failed to comply
with an FTC consent order that required a divestiture trustee.99
Despite the FTC’s efforts, some recent cases have not turned out
entirely as planned. For example, in the FTC’s recent case against
Whole Foods, a consent order initially required Whole Foods to
divest thirty-two stores.100 But eventually the FTC approved the sale
of only three by a divestiture trustee because buyers could not be
found for the rest.101 The buyer subsequently removed one of the
stores that was sold from the market.102
A federal court recently fined Boston Scientific $7 million for
“flouting” a consent order with the FTC that required the company
to license intravascular ultrasound technology to a competitor,
which may have caused the competitor to leave the relevant
market.103 Although this particular divestiture was not effective, the
court’s decision highlighted the importance of compliance with FTC
orders, vindicated the authority of the FTC, and pointed out the
obligation of the parties to follow the FTC staff ’s interpretation of
the order.104 Ultimately, although the FTC’s more aggressive
approach to divestitures has been unable to prevent all competitive
problems, the FTC has studied its past failures, and its firm stance
continues to gain respect from courts and merging firms alike. 
97. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at iii.
98. Id. at 6 n.14 (citing FTC Docket No. 9148, 102 F.T.C. 1700 (1986) (decision and order),
modified, 107 F.T.C. 403 (1986), preliminary injunction granted, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶
67,950 (M.D. Ga. 1988), vacated & remanded for dismissal, 849 F.2d 551 (11th Cir. 1988), pet.
for reh’g denied, 858 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1988)).
99. See id. at 7 n.14.
100. See James Rowley & Chris Burrit, Whole Foods to Sell 32 Wild Oats Natural-Food
Stores, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2009, 5:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=a7uuO6vwl4jU.
101. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Whole Foods Market’s
Divestiture of Three Stores and Wild Oats Intellectual Property, Denies Sale of Wild Oats
Intellectual Property to Topco Associates (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2010/06/foodinternet.shtm.
102. Id.
103. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Judge Issues Record $7 Million Fine
Against Boston Scientific Corporation (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/
2003/03/bostonsci.shtm.
104. See id.
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III. CONVERGENCE OF THE FTC’S AND DOJ’S DIVESTITURE POLICIES
A. Common Ground Between the Agencies
In looking for an acceptable buyer, the two agencies consider
many of the same criteria. To begin with, both agencies strongly
prefer divestitures over conduct-based remedies.105 Both agencies
cite a preference for the divestiture of discrete business units,
finding that divesting less than a full business unit often fails to
create an effective long-term competitor and noting that such pro-
posals will be subjected to higher scrutiny.106 The 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, which the FTC and the DOJ jointly compiled to
clarify the calculus behind government merger review, state that,
depending on the relationship between the relevant market and
other “inextricably linked” markets, a partial divestiture might be
unsatisfactory.107 
Additionally, the agencies seek similar criteria in buyers. The
DOJ often refuses to accept a buyer with significant presence in the
relevant market, requires that the buyer have an incentive to use
the divestiture asset to compete in the relevant market and not to
compete in a different market, and subjects buyers to a “fitness” test
to check the buyer’s skill, expertise, and long-term financial ability
to compete effectively in the relevant market.108 The FTC similarly
looks at the skill and expertise of the buyer in the relevant market,
the buyer’s commitment to the market, and the buyer’s size.109
105. See Logan M. Breed & David J. Michnal, Merger Remedies: The DOJ’s New Guide to
Old Differences with the FTC, 19 ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, at 37, 37 & n.3 (“For example, the
Division filed 55 consent decrees in merger cases from 1997–2000; all but four of the decrees
involved divestiture.”); see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS 295–96 (Ilene K. Gotts ed., 2d ed. 2001).
106. See 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 8-10 (describing the DOJ’s preference
for divestiture of discrete business units but noting that there may be some situations in
which divestiture of less than a full business unit may be appropriate); see also FTC
STATEMENT, supra note 4.
107. 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 3, at 30 n.14.
108. 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 30-32.
109. DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 34-35.
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B. Structural Differences Between the Agencies
The goals, then, of divestiture at both antitrust agencies are the
same. From a general economic perspective, the purpose of a
divestiture is simply to create a new entity that has the same ability
to compete and the same incentives to innovate and expand as the
firm that disappears due to the merger.110 However, after the
passage of the HSR Act, the two agencies have often been perceived
to espouse different approaches regarding the creation of a success-
ful divestiture package.111 Substantial differences remain between
the divestiture preferences of the agencies, and because firms do not
have control over which agency will investigate and analyze a
particular merger, they are still faced with a discomforting level of
uncertainty. Carl Shapiro and Michael Sohn note that “[f]amiliarity
with the consent decree process—the philosophy behind the agen-
cies’ settlement posture, as reflected in public statements by officials
and negotiated consent decrees—can ... be critically important.”112
As long as inconsistencies between the agencies persist, it is indeed
essential that merging firms familiarize themselves with the
different policies they will face when negotiating with the FTC and
the DOJ.
Inherent in the merger investigation process and the negotiation
of an appropriate divestiture is considerable uncertainty, which
creates risk that must be accounted for by merging firms.113 The
agencies should seek to create policies that reduce risks to competi-
tion by trying to promote quick and effective divestitures.114 The
merging parties, of course, face different risks in the face of a
110. See id. at iii (detailing a study done by FTC staff of divestiture orders that the
Commission issued between 1990 and 1994).
111. See supra text accompanying note 11.
112. Carl Shapiro & Michael Sohn, “Crown Jewel” Provisions in Merger Consent Decrees,
12 ANTITRUST, Fall 1997, at 27, 27.
113. See id.
114. See id. (“The agencies generally seek to reduce three types of risk to competition that
can arise out of divestiture decrees: (a) the risk that a slow divestiture will harm competition
during an interim period and/or cause the divested assets to wither; (b) the risk that no strong
buyer will appear to purchase the divested assets; and (c) the risk that foot-dragging by the
merged company will undermine the ability of the divestee to compete effectively.”).
2012] SETTING THE TERMS OF A BREAK-UP 2167
divestiture, all of which may lead to an unprofitable transaction.115
For example, one risk to which Shapiro and Sohn point is the
possibility that the agency will appoint a divestiture trustee who
will attempt to create a more attractive divestiture package by
selling one of the merging firms’ valuable assets, a “crown jewel.”116
This policy shifts a great amount of risk from the agency onto the
merging firms and has been increasingly favored by the FTC.117
Structural and product market differences could account for this
difference in willingness to become more involved in creating and
carrying out a divestiture remedy.
The two agencies’ different approaches to divestiture remedies
may derive in part from the agencies’ notable structural differences.
The FTC has a separate section—or “shop”— dedicated to compli-
ance, which negotiates consent decrees alongside the investigation
staff and takes care of the administration of consent decrees on its
own.118 The DOJ does not have a separate section, so the staff mem-
bers who investigate the merger are also responsible for negotiating
and administering consent decrees.119 The fact that the FTC has a
separate shop to deal with remedies may lead the FTC to be more
willing to require remedies that involve more agency involvement.
The product market in which a merger occurs may also affect the
success of a divestiture. In their investigations, the agencies deal
with different industries, which may cause industry-specific dif-
ferences in divestiture packages and policies. Although the agencies
agreed in March 2003 to assign some industries to one or the other
agency,120 because of the clearance process, this agreement does not
115. See, e.g., id. (listing various risks, including “(a) the risk that the appointment of a
trustee to sell the assets will lead to a fire-sale price; (b) the risk that the divestiture will
disrupt efficiencies; and (c) the risk that the trustee will choose to augment the asset package
to attract a buyer”). 
116. Id. at 30.
117. See infra Part III.C.3.
118. Michael H. Byowitz & Lori S. Sherman, U.S. Antitrust Merger Remedies: FTC vs.
DOJ? 31 (Mar. 11, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://apps.americanbar.
org/intlaw/calendar/spring2006/papers/WED230410BYOWITZ_516.DOC.
119. Id.
120. Media Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 45 (allocating to the FTC “airframes;
autos and trucks; building materials; chemicals; computer hardware; energy; grocery
manufacturing; the operation of grocery stores; healthcare; industrial gases; munitions;
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology; professional services; the operation of retail stores;
satellite manufacturing and launch vehicles; and textiles[;]” and allocating to the DOJ
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necessarily make it clear to merging firms which agency will ap-
prove their merger.
Most studies of divestiture success have been narrowly focused on
specific mergers and the product markets in which they occurred.121
As Michael H. Byowitz and Lori S. Sherman note, no studies have
been conducted to determine whether industry differences lead the
agencies to approach divestiture remedies differently.122 In some
markets, a successful competitive solution may require the divesti-
ture of a whole line of products.123 For example, with pharmaceutical
mergers, often an entire line of products must be divested in order
to achieve the necessary competitive remedy.124 On the other hand,
both agencies have accepted divestitures of less than discrete busi-
ness units in product markets when divestiture of a whole business
unit was not necessary.125 Whether the agencies accept proposals of
stand-alone assets rather than discrete business units depends on
an analysis of the product market and the complications that will be
created by breaking up a business unit rather than conducting a
“clean sweep.”126 
When the FTC considers a divestiture, it conducts a public com-
ment period during which the public can weigh in on the proposed
“aeronautics; agriculture and associated biotechnology; avionics; beer; computer software;
cosmetics and hair care; defense electronics; financial services, insurance, and stock, option,
bond, and commodity markets; flat glass; health insurance; industrial equipment; media and
entertainment; metals, mining, and minerals; missiles, tanks, and armored vehicles; naval
defense products; photography and film; pulp, paper, lumber, and timber; telecommunications
services and equipment; travel and transportation; and waste”).
121. See, e.g., Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 4-5 (describing studies looking at two local
markets in Connecticut to determine the impact of divestitures related to Royal Ahold’s 1996
supermarket acquisition of Stop & Shop; analyzing two 1984 oil mergers (Texaco-Getty Oil
and Socal-Gulf Oil); and examining the performance of divested bank branches associated
with mergers). 
122. See Byowitz & Sherman, supra note 118, at 30.
123. See Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 2.
124. See id. 
125. See, e.g., United States v. Premdor, Inc., No. 1:01CV01696, 2002 WL 1816981, at *4-6
(D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2002) (explaining that the DOJ required the acquiring firm, Premdor, to divest
one facility and related assets but allowed it to keep remainder of target company’s North
American business in the related market); Valero Energy Corp., No. C-4031, 2002 WL 254223,
at *7 (F.T.C. Feb. 19, 2002) (noting that FTC required divestiture of only one refinery).
126. See, e.g., Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
Dep’t of Justice, Houston, We Have a Competitive Problem: How Can We Remedy It? 7-9 (Apr.
17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/11112.htm.
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divestiture.127 The FTC makes available to the public copies of its
complaints, consent orders, and analysis—which are available on its
website and in hard copy—to aid the public in understanding its
rationale.128 For example, in the FTC’s case against Whole Foods
Market, the FTC assigned Whole Foods a divestiture trustee, who
petitioned for several divestitures in March 2010.129 After each
proposal, the FTC opened a thirty-day period during which the
public—interested customers, competitors, and others—was allowed
to give its input on the suggested divestiture solution. The FTC
received 531 comments on the trustee’s proposal to divest a Whole
Foods (formerly Wild Oats) store in Portland, Maine, to Trader
Joe’s.130 Although the FTC does extensive research into consumers’
and competitors’ opinions of proposed transactions, the public
comment period provides another opportunity for interested parties
to give their input. The DOJ does not have a similar mechanism for
consumers to comment on a proposed remedy.
C. Areas in Which the Agencies’ Policies Diverge
In the decades since the passage of the HSR Act, both agencies
have become more proactive in their requirements in premerger
divestiture orders.131 Each agency has begun to favor certain types
of provisions in divestiture orders. The agencies have differing
policies on “fix-it-first” remedies, which are put into place before the
merger is consummated; choosing up-front buyers, which requires
the divesting party to find a buyer up front, reducing the risk that
the parties will be unable to find an adequate buyer and shortening
the time period for potential competitive harm but limiting flexibil-
ity of the divestiture package;132 and crown jewel provisions, by
127. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 25; see generally Public
Comments, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/os/publiccomments.shtm (last visited Mar.
28, 2012) (listing all matters open for and previously open for public comment).
128. E.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 101.
129. Id.
130. Public Comments on Trustee’s Proposal for Sale of Portland, Maine, Store Under Whole
Foods Market Inc. Divestiture Order, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
wholefoodspet2/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
131. For a fuller description of the evolution of divestiture orders at the FTC, see
DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 4-6.
132. See id. at 3.
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which the agency requires additional divestiture of a certain high-
value asset or larger group of assets in order to create a larger pool
of acceptable buyers if the original divestiture does not occur
within the time required in the order.133 The DOJ favors fix-it-first
remedies134 and tends to shy away from choosing up-front buyers135
and requiring crown jewel provisions.136 The FTC, by contrast,
favors locking parties into a binding consent order rather than a
fix-it-first solution.137 Indeed, the FTC does not favor fix-it-first pro-
posals, often requires up-front buyers,138 and frequently uses crown
jewel provisions.139
1. Fix-It-First Remedies
The DOJ favors fix-it-first remedies, which allow the parties to
implement a structural solution to competitive concerns before the
merger is consummated, eliminating the need to file a case.140 In
this situation, the agency attempts to “preserve” competition, rather
than to replace it, by allowing the parties to fix the problems with
their own transaction, thus permitting the merger to go through
with minimal changes.141 The DOJ has stated that it does not dis-
courage the fix-it-first approach and that if the parties’ proposed
divestiture alleviates competitive concerns, the DOJ will not force
them to enter into a binding order.142 The 2011 DOJ Policy Guide to
Merger Remedies notes the efficiency of allowing the parties to fix
potential competitive problems without involving the courts, as well
as the flexibility that such a solution allows the parties in proposing
a unique set of assets that will make a proposed purchaser competi-
133. See supra text accompanying note 116.
134. See infra Part III.C.1.
135. See infra Part III.C.2.
136. See infra Part III.C.3.
137. See infra Part III.C.1.
138. See infra Part III.C.2.
139. See infra Part III.C.3.
140. See 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 (“With a fix-it-first remedy, in
contrast [with a binding court order], the parties modify or ‘fix’ the transaction before
consummation to eliminate any competitive concern. There is no complaint or other court
filing.”).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 26-27.
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tive.143 As a caveat to the general principle that fix-it-first remedies
are acceptable, fix-it-first remedies are deemed unacceptable if post-
merger supervision is required,144 and the DOJ maintains that the
fix-it-first remedy must have no less substantive relief than could be
obtained through a court.145 The 2011 DOJ Policy Guide also adds
that fix-it-first solutions will not be acceptable if a consent decree is
needed to enforce and monitor ongoing postmerger obligations on
the part of the merged firms, such as firewalls.146
The FTC, on the other hand, does not have a formal policy on fix-
it-first remedies and typically prefers to have a binding order.147 The
FTC often requires a consent decree because the agency then has
greater control over the divestiture asset package.148 In a number of
situations, the agencies have been faced with similar cases and
reacted differently to fix-it-first solutions.149 The FTC has recently
required consent decrees in several large acquisitions.150
143. See 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 22.
144. 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 28.
145. 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 22-23. 
146. Id. at 23.
147. See FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4 (stating that the divestiture remedy is required in
the majority of mergers).
148. See, e.g., William J. Baer & Ronald C. Redcay, Solving Competition Problems in
Merger Control: The Requirements for an Effective Divestiture Remedy, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
915, 924 (2001) (discussing a situation in which the FTC used a consent decree to exert
greater control over the divestiture package).
149. Compare Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public
Comment at 1-2, Buckeye Partners, FTC File No. 041-0162 (Sept. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0410162/040927anal0410162.pdf (stating that the parties
restructured their agreement in response to FTC concerns, but the FTC required them to
enter into a consent order nonetheless), with Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Reuters Ltd. and
Moneyline Telerate Restructure Proposed Deal to Alleviate Justice Department’s Antitrust
Concerns (May 24, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/
2005/209146.pdf (stating that the DOJ allowed the restructured deal between two global
providers of financial information to go through without a consent order).
150. See, e.g., Kris Hudson, FTC Sets Terms for Simon to Buy Prime Outlets, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487048045045756068926768
12822.html (requiring divestiture of one outlet center and removal of certain restrictions on
outlet retailers); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Requires Universal Health Services
to Sell 15 Psychiatric Facilities as a Condition of Acquiring Rival Psychiatric Services (Nov.
15, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/psychsol.htm (requiring Universal
Health Services to divest fifteen psychiatric facilities to approved buyers before approving the
merger).
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2. Up-Front Buyers
Another method of attempting to prevent competitive harm is
requiring the merging firms to propose a buyer at the outset of an
investigation. As described in the 2004 DOJ Policy Guide, the DOJ
typically focuses on the assembly of an adequate divestiture package
rather than choosing an acceptable buyer, assuming that when the
appropriate asset package is put together, an acceptable buyer will
be forthcoming.151 But as the FTC found in the Whole Foods case, for
example, this is not always the case.152 The DOJ’s test for an
acceptable buyer takes into account three factors: (1) the divestiture
itself must not cause competitive harm, (2) the potential buyer must
have incentive to enter the market in question, and (3) the potential
buyer must be “fit” to enter the market in terms of finances and
expertise.153
The FTC favors requiring firms to propose an acceptable buyer up
front. As noted in the FTC’s 1999 Divestiture Study, “The require-
ment of premerger notification enables the antitrust agencies to
insist that parties agree to remedies, including divestitures, before
they permit the parties to consummate their transactions.”154 As
described in the Study, the FTC often insists that firms propose a
buyer up front in order to minimize the amount of interim time
between the consummation of the merger and the divestiture.155
Allowing the firms to merge without an acceptable buyer at hand
increases the risk that an acceptable buyer will not be found and
that the remedy will be unsuccessful.156 The Divestiture Study also
notes that requiring an up-front buyer shifts risk from the buyer,
who is otherwise left with a steep learning curve to become a suc-
cessful competitor, onto the respondent firm, who cannot consum-
mate the merger without the FTC’s approval of a viable buyer.157
151. 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 30 n.42 (“[T]he Division focuses on specifying
in the decree the appropriate set of assets to be divested quickly rather than on the
identification of an acceptable buyer.”).
152. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
153. 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 30-32.
154. See DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 3.
155. Id. at 42. 
156. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
157. DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 42.
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For example, in Johnson & Johnson’s 2006 acquisition of Pfizer’s
consumer health division, an up-front buyer was chosen before the
FTC approved the transaction.158 
3. Crown Jewel Provisions
In its 2004 Policy Guide, the DOJ indicated that it “strongly
disfavors” so-called crown jewel provisions, in which the divesting
firm must set aside an additional asset, usually a particularly val-
uable one, to be divested if the parties are unable to sell the
originally agreed-upon divestiture package to an acceptable buyer.159
The DOJ views such provisions as indicative of accepting something
less than the optimal divestiture package—either less or more than
is necessary to remedy existing competitive concerns.160 In the 2004
Policy Guide, the DOJ explained that the requirement of a crown
jewel provision indicates a lack of confidence in the original
divestiture package, potentially entails punishment of the divesting
firm when restoring competition—not punishing the merging
firms—is the objective, and leaves the potential for purchaser
manipulation by creating incentives for potential purchasers to
delay or underbid.161 The 2011 DOJ Policy Guide suggests the
possibility that the DOJ may condition acceptance of a proposed
package on the inclusion of a crown jewel if an acceptable buyer
cannot be found, but does not include extensive discussion of these
provisions.162
The FTC, on the other hand, clearly favors crown jewel provi-
sions. As explained in the FTC’s Divestiture Study, the FTC believes
that a crown jewel provision creates the assurance that if the
original divestiture package does not sell to an acceptable buyer, a
“more saleable” package will draw an acceptable buyer.163 The
Divestiture Study also notes that “[n]o respondent subject to a
158. See Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 2.
159. 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 36.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 36-37.
162. 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 24.
163. DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 30; FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 22 n.31
(“In any case, it is a package of assets that the staff has concluded will be more readily
divested because, for example, the pool of acceptable buyers is larger.”).
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crown jewel provision has ever failed to divest within the time
required by the order,” indicating that the crown jewel provision
also serves the purpose of creating further incentives for the
merging firms to cooperate with the agency.164 The Study describes
the crown jewel provision as a “threat” rather than a punishment.165
The preference for crown jewel provisions is a clear example of the
FTC’s more proactive stance in ensuring that the merging firms do
not purposely propose a weak divestiture package.
D. Antitrust Community Concerns About the Differences Between
the Agencies’ Divestiture Policies
Although the FTC and DOJ largely agree as to what makes an
effective divestiture, a number of differences—both perceived and
actual—persist in the agencies’ policies. The DOJ’s more hands-off
policy seems to leave the decision as to what makes a buyer ac-
ceptable in the hands of the merging firms. To illustrate, in a DOJ
divestiture order, the divesting party chooses a buyer, and the DOJ
generally approves it, absent a legitimate, objective reason not to.166
The DOJ policy is supported by a more free-market view of competi-
tion, which assumes that the market will take care of competition
issues and which allows the government only a minimal role in
controlling potentially anticompetitive situations.
The FTC’s divestiture policy seems less trusting of the free
market. The FTC is more involved in choosing a buyer and allows
the public to voice its opinion once a buyer has been proposed.167
Once the divesting party has proposed a buyer, the FTC opens a
thirty-day period for public comment during which any party may
assert its complaints or concerns about the proposed divestiture.168 
164. DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 35, at 30-31 n.35.
165. Id.
166. See 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 30 n.42.
167. See Dr Pepper/Seven-Up Companies, Inc. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(stating that in a proceeding for FTC approval pursuant to Rule 2.41(f), the burden of proof
is on the party seeking approval to demonstrate that it should be granted); FTC STATEMENT,
supra note 4, at 20-21 (describing how the FTC evaluates proposed divestitures and
acceptable buyers); Frequently Asked Questions About Merger Consent Order Provisions, supra
note 18.
168. See FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 21.
2012] SETTING THE TERMS OF A BREAK-UP 2175
This difference in attitude affects merging parties’ strategies in
proposing divestitures; firms are more likely to propose buyers who
will present less of a competitive threat when dealing with the DOJ
than with the FTC. 
Over time, the FTC has gained a reputation for being the more
“aggressive” of the two antitrust agencies.169 Recently, antitrust
observers have perceived an uptick in the number of cases both
antitrust agencies have challenged, especially the FTC.170 Shapiro
and Sohn, for instance, highlight the “FTC’s emerging policies to
strengthen its consent orders” noting that “[t]he FTC has become
more aggressive in this area, with very real, practical implications
for companies considering mergers.”171 Several attorneys from law
firms that frequently deal with the antitrust agencies have pointed
out that the agencies’ “divergent approaches to certain key ... issues
have real world consequences for merger parties,” including unnec-
essary delay in integrating the merging firms while consent decrees
are being negotiated.172 Ultimately, merging parties may face higher
transaction costs because the differing merger remedy polices create
“confusion and uncertainty in the merger review process.”173
Both the DOJ and FTC have responded to antitrust community
concerns about the differences in their divestiture policies by
increasing the transparency of the process. In recent years, both
agencies have issued statements attempting to clarify the process
of negotiating a divestiture.174 In April 2003, the FTC’s Bureau of
Competition issued a statement on negotiating merger remedies.175
In October 2004, the DOJ issued a similar Policy Guide to Merger
Remedies.176 
The DOJ’s most recent Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, pub-
lished in June 2011, indicates acceptance of more involved policies
169. Heidi N. Moore, Beware of the FTC, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2010/11/04/beware-of-the-f-t-c/ (noting the FTC’s recent “intense activity” and “aggressive
stance” on merger enforcement).
170. See id. (describing the antitrust agencies as “on the warpath”).
171. Shapiro & Sohn, supra note 112, at 27.
172. See, e.g., Byowitz & Sherman, supra note 118, at 31.
173. See Breed & Michnal, supra note 105, at 37; Byowitz & Sherman, supra note 118, at
31.
174. See 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1-2; FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4, at 1.
175. See FTC STATEMENT, supra note 4.
176. See 2004 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4.
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in DOJ practice.177 The updated Policy Guide provides guidance to
attorneys in the Division but also gives merging firms a picture of
the type of fixes the DOJ may find acceptable.178 Changes since the
2004 Policy Guide show that in actual practice, DOJ attorneys may
in fact require up-front buyers or crown jewel provisions, both of
which are policies that indicate a shift in risk onto the parties.179
The DOJ has maintained its stance on fix-it-first remedies, which
do not require a court order to bind the parties.180
IV. THE FTC’S POLICY IS STRONGER AND THUS SHOULD BE
ADOPTED BY THE DOJ
A. Consistency Between the Agencies Is Essential
Economic changes are likely to precipitate more reported mergers
and acquisitions, and with its recent challenges to proposed
mergers, the FTC has made clear that potentially anticompetitive
mergers will face substantial hurdles.181 In light of this potential
increase in antitrust enforcement, concerns regarding lack of trans-
parency and consistency from the agencies may become more
acute.182
The Obama administration brought a number of well-recognized
faces to the leadership of both antitrust agencies, namely Christine
Varney as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and Jon
Leibowitz as Chairman of the FTC, both of whom have extensive
track records as enforcement officials.183 Although Varney has
177. 2011 DOJ POLICY GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1. 
178. Id.
179. Id. at 9, 23-24.
180. Id. at 22.
181. See Moore, supra note 169.
182. See Breed & Michnal, supra note 105, at 37 (“[D]ifferences between the agencies’
approaches to merger remedies may create confusion and uncertainty in the merger review
process.”).
183. See Thomas Catan & Gina Chon,  Antitrust Chief to Step Down, WALL ST. J., July 7,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303544604576430171298566868.html
(describing Varney as a “tough and politically savvy” antitrust chief who “spearheaded the
Obama administration’s drive to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement”); Brent Kendall,
Leibowitz Tapped as FTC Chairman, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123578105746497981.html (stating that Leibowitz “has tended to favor aggressive
enforcement” and citing his nomination as a “signal of the White House’s interest in strong
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stepped down, the appointment of new chief federal enforcers may
usher in renewed efforts on the part of both agencies to toughen
antitrust enforcement.184 Additionally, both the DOJ and FTC have
newly appointed chief economists in their respective economics
sections, both of whom are well poised to pursue antitrust policy
aggressively.185 
As a senator, President Obama himself promised to step up
merger enforcement and to carefully review merger activity for
anticompetitive deals, noting that during the period from 2001 to
2006, the agencies together challenged, on average, less than half
as many mergers per year as during the period from 1996 to 2000
and that the DOJ under the Bush administration had not brought
a single case for monopolization.186 As noted by critics of Bush-era
antitrust enforcement, the number of preliminary injunctions and
administrative complaints brought by the FTC was significantly
higher than the number brought by the DOJ during the Bush ad-
ministration. For example, in 2009, despite a smaller number of
filed mergers, the FTC filed a record number of complaints.187 Thus,
the Obama administration and new DOJ leadership have an
opportunity to align with the FTC in its more skeptical and more in-
volved stance on divestitures and to present a unified and consistent
front of aggressive competition policy. For purposes of predictability,
the agencies should aim for consistency in their overall analysis,
including their consideration of fix-it-first remedies, up-front buyers,
crown jewel provisions, and how they choose an acceptable buyer for
a divestiture package.
antitrust enforcement”).
184. See Kendall, supra note 183.
185. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz Appoints Senior
Staff (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/04/seniorstaff.htm (stating that
newly appointed Director of the Bureau of Economics Joseph Farrell had served as deputy
assistant attorney general and chief economist for the Antitrust Division of the DOJ); James
Rowley, Expert Who Supported Microsoft Breakup Joins Justice Department, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 12, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aVSy5ioz7EeI (stating that the hiring of Carl Shapiro was “fresh evidence the Obama
administration plan[ned] aggressive antitrust enforcement”).
186. See Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American
Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/node/
10883.
187. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC IN 2009: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ANNUAL
REPORT 4 (2009).
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B. The FTC’s Policy of Active Involvement in Divestitures Lowers
Risk to Consumers
Ultimately, both agencies should embrace the FTC’s more
proactive stance in the creation of divestiture packages. Both agen-
cies have experienced problems with compliance with divestiture
orders.188 The most recent study of the effectiveness of divestitures
was conducted by the FTC in 1999.189 Both agencies would likely
benefit from another wider study of what makes a divestiture
effective and how the economic realities of the current day should
weigh in with the factors considered in the assembly of a divestiture
package.190 A 2002 GAO report highlighted the need for an FTC
Study to assess the effects of divestitures, given that such a study
has not been conducted since the mid-1990s.191 The GAO recom-
mended that the FTC’s Bureau of Competition and Bureau of
Economics review the impact of divestiture orders in the retail
market and other sectors to look at the current viability of divesti-
ture buyers and competition in the relevant marketplace.192 The
GAO also suggested that the FTC conduct an analysis to determine
whether changes to FTC divestiture practices since the mid-1990s
have impacted marketplace competition.193
CONCLUSION
It is the purview of the antitrust agencies not only to analyze
transactions for potential competitive problems but to work with the
merging firms to resolve competitive problems that do arise. The
188. See, e.g., Lindell, supra note 27.
189. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the 1999 FTC Divestiture Study.
190. Individuals have conducted independent studies of the effectiveness of divestitures on
a smaller scale. See, e.g., Tenn & Yun, supra note 21, at 2 (“Despite being a widely used tool
in merger enforcement, there have been few studies of whether antitrust divestitures are
successful.... We help fill this void by conducting a study of [the divestitures relating to]
Johnson & Johnson’s ... $16.6 billion acquisition of Pfizer’s consumer health division in
2006.”).
191. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-793, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS: FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STUDY NEEDED TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF RECENT
DIVESTITURES ON COMPETITION IN RETAIL MARKETS 7 (2002).
192. Id. at 49.
193. Id.
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FTC’s more aggressive policy of forcing more of the risks associated
with a merger onto the merging firms is the most effective means of
creating a successful and lasting solution to anticompetitive issues.
Courts have supported this more involved position and have not
allowed merging firms to circumvent the FTC’s potentially demand-
ing orders. 
Despite the lack of empirical information about the success of the
FTC’s policies, it is clear that in order to ensure the maintenance of
competition after a merger, the agency should take a hands-on ap-
proach to crafting an antitrust remedy to each unique case. The
FTC’s policy of involvement is a more effective means of making
sure a divestiture adequately remedies the competition lost in a
merger. Ultimately, the FTC’s divestiture policy shifts risk away
from consumers, which is the fundamental objective of antitrust
enforcement.194
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